


## East Asia



# Percentage World GDP

Strategic Asia 2001, NBR

	1950	1973	1998	2015
Asia	19	24	37	43
Europe	30	29	23	<19
North America	31	25	25	<17
Russia	10	9	3	3

# “Ripe for Rivalry?”

- Flashpoints vs. longer term
- Transition from hegemonic stability to multipolarity
- 500 years of European history
- At best, 19th century Europe
- Realism and balance of power

Aaron Friedberg, *International Security* (1993)

# Security Community? The End-state of Neo-liberal Institutionalism

- Modern Europe
  - Different
  - Democracy matters = not pure power politics
- Constructivism:
  - Social, political, economic interaction
  - Identity Change
  - Changes in definitions of national interest
- “...the Way Ahead for Asia.”

Adm Blair, *IHT* 4/21/2000; Adm. Fargo, 5/17/00 speech

# Issues for Discussion

- Korean Peninsula
- Taiwan Straits
- Growing China
- Future of Japan
- Assess Rivalry, Community, other options

# U.S. Interests, Goals and Options

- Freedom of seas and airspace
- Stability and “general deterrence”
- Peer competitor/ regional hegemon
  - Prevent or accommodate?
- WMD
  - Preclude or accommodate?
- Democracy
  - Promote, and deal with trade-offs

# The Stakes in Korea

- South Korea - 13<sup>th</sup> largest GDP, 6<sup>th</sup> largest military, key economic nexus for U.S.
- Japan - 3<sup>rd</sup> largest GDP, major military budget
- China - 2<sup>nd</sup> largest GDP, military/nuclear power, Security Council
- North Korea - 5<sup>th</sup> largest military, nuclear capable, failed economy
- Taiwan - 17<sup>th</sup> largest GDP, key economic hub
- Other: New declared serial producer of nuclear weapons; non-proliferation “regime”; loss of general deterrence

# Japan's Strategic View





# Background

- 1990s
  - Missiles
  - indecision about how to reward/punish;
  - Kim wanted Clinton; Clinton willing, but aides weak
- Intell
  - 1993 - plutonium for 1 or 2 weapons;
  - changes in interpretation lat 1980s, early 1990s, mid-1990s.

# Background

- 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula:
  - Neither will “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.”
- May 1993 Nodong 1 test missile into Sea of Japan

# 1994 “Agreed Framework”

- Froze plutonium reprocessing at Yongbyon
- U.S. will supply heavy fuel oil and lead multinational project to build two LWRs
- U.S. will “provide formal assurances” not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against DPRK.
- Many interpretations re timing, extent of delivery, disclosure
- Reliant upon ROK, Japanese money

» J. Pollack, *NWCR* (Summer 2003).

# From nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles

- August 1998 3-stage Taepodong 1 over northern Honshu
- Perry approach:
  - “comprehensive and integrated approach [to ensure] the DPRK des not have a nuclear weapons program.”
  - “complete and verifiable cessation of testing, production, and deployment of missiles....”
- June 2000 -- first South-North Korean Summit
- 2000 election -- Clinton considers summit

# Background

- Transition: mixed advice; rhetorical flourishes, “pygmy,” etc.
- Policy review (PCC’s): no appeasement; %100 verification;
- Kim Dae-Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” and courting of Washington
- 911
- January 2002 “Axis of Evil”
- June 2002 USMA speech, *NSS* places NK as prime rogue threat
- Mid-2002: “Bold move.” “Who wants to be Special Envoy?”  
Cabinet...DepSec’s...UnderSec’s...Asst Sec’s..... AsstSecEAP  
James Kelly.
- No high-level contact in first year

# Background

- October 2002 visit and presentation of evidence by Kelly
  - Violation of spirit of '94 agreement
  - Precondition: verifiably dismantle covert nuclear activities
- Denial...We have them; it's your choice; resolution requires new treaty
- DPRK offer: U.S. recognize DPRK sovereignty; assures DPRK of nonaggression; do not hinder economic development
- U.S. response: will “talk” but not “negotiate” until verifiable dismantlement; suspends heavy fuel oil shipments
- December 2003 NK requests IAEA withdraw seals, cameras, expulsion of inspectors; issue now between U.S. and NK only
- Jan 10, 2003 announcement of withdrawal from NPT, open reactivation of plutonium program
- Fall, 2003, NK a “hellish nightmare,” UnderSecState Bolton
  - » Amb. J. Pritchard lecture, Salzburg, 12/03, and misc articles

# Six Party Talks

- US, China, Japan, NK, SK, Russia
  - 5/6 agree to CVID: Complete (PI and HEU, all other nuclear materials and weapons programs), Verifiable (Inspections by IAEA, or 6 country teams or UNSC sanctioned), Irreversible (via complete dismantlement so there is no turning back)  
Disarmament
  - Established Working Groups
  - Agree to place time limits on meetings
  - \*\* institutionalization of process\*\*

# What do they have?

- Unknowns
  - HEU program not clear
  - Plutonium for 2-3 nukes
  - “nuclear capability;” “will to defend;” “ultimate defense;”
- **1998 Pakistan-DPRK cooperation??**
  - Would indicate ability to build as well as enrich



# U.S. Options

- Draw line in sand? (Clinton: enrichment); missile firing? Testing?
- Risk war by standing 100% firm. “To do otherwise at this juncture is to risk future perils by postponing the inevitable: a nuclear Korean peninsula and instability in Northeast Asia.” Freeze is inadequate. Balbina Hwang, Heritage Foundation.

# U.S. Options (cont'd.)

- War: Is NK like Iraq?
  - No WMD use against own people or neighbors
  - No defiance of SC resolutions
  - No obvious links to terrorist groups
  - Neighbors should have interest and ability to pressure Pyongyang
- Limited Strikes (1994)

# U.S. Options (cont'd.)

- Concessions/ Security Guarantee
  - President's October 2003 statement at APEC (Bangkok)
  - But – not before “verifiable progress”
  - NK seemed to offer last week to freeze **military** program; US, J want more
- Incentives? LWR years behind schedule. Japanese have had enough. \$1B into failing process via KEDO.

# DPRK views

- Seoul no longer in position of strength as before Asian Financial Crisis
- “Wedge strategy:” since end of cold war has sought to negotiate exclusively with U.S.
- What are ultimate aims if granted non-aggression statement by U.S.?

# DPRK options

- Intentional war?
- Denuclearization along Libya, Iran models?
  - What changed Qaddafi's mind?
  - .... Tehran?
- The problem -- IAEA in Iraq and Iran
  - Iran was running multiple U-enrichment programs; failed to disclose even when given opportunity last October
  - “I hope this will be the last time any aspect of the program has not been declared to us.” Mohammed El Baradei, IAEA
- What rewards will Libya receive?

# U.S.-ROK relations

ROK FM 3/5/04

- 7<sup>th</sup> lgst trading partner
- 4<sup>th</sup> lgst market for US agricultural goods
- 3<sup>rd</sup> lgst contingent of troops in Iraq
- \$260m committed to reconstruction of Iraq
- Full participant in GWOT, inc Afghanistan
- Relocation of Yongsan-based troops
  - Firm commitment on both sides
- Relocation of 2<sup>nd</sup> ID, in DMZ and northern part of ROK
  - Two stages: north of Han River, then two areas south of Han River (details remain)

# Further Questions

## The Korean Peninsula Demilitarized Zone Area





# Taiwan Strait Area





# Taiwan and the Straits

- Flashpoint with chance of major war
- 1995 PRC military exercises
- March 1996 de facto blockade of T's two largest ports with ballistic missile tests, U.S. deployment of two carrier battle groups near island
- April 2001 EP-3 incident

# Significance/ U.S. Interests

- Only Chinese democracy
- Recent transition as in Hong Kong, South Korea
- Regional hub for trade
- Political symbolism, U.S. reputation, “general deterrence”

# Taiwan Background

- 1949-1980s: Common nationalism
  - One China; reunification, under KMT or CCP
- 1980s-90s: Diverging nationalisms: two states
  - PRC reassertion
  - Dramatic democratization within Taiwan; loss of international status after 1971
  - Stalled negotiations: T rejects “one China” after Hong Kong and PRC rejects T as “state”
- Failure of transformation based on economic transactions
  - Failure of European model
  - No security community!

# Remilitarization in the 1990s

- PRC buildup in Fujian
- 1995-97 crises
- Request of more arms from U.S.
- Victory of Democratic Progressive Party and President Chen Shui-bian
  - Desire for referendum on 20 March
  - ...”promises unfathomable destructive potentials.” *China Daily*

# PRC's "New Diplomacy" and its Limits

- "China's New Outlook" and "New Diplomatic Approach"
  - Economic globalization requires rapid domestic development and economic transformation
  - New round of technological development will bring massive changes socially, economically, militarily
  - East Asia will emerge as a global powerhouse
  - Peace and development are main themes of the epoch
- This does not apply to "unification of the motherland" and the "protection of all Chinese."

# “China’s Legislative Agenda”

Premier Wen Jiabao 3/5/04

- Top priority is development, 7% steady growth
- Government renewal and overhaul, against corruption, waste
- Improvement of lot of poor, especially rural poor; decrease economic gaps
- Increase consumer confidence over long term; increase consumer spending immediately
- Reduce role of state in economy
- Rationalize massive construction projects
- Improve access to education, health care

# PRC Legislative Agenda (cont'd.)

- ...#9: “Strengthen socialist democracy and maintain national security.”
- Expand democracy to lowest levels, giving workers greater voice
- Improve national defense capabilities
  - Recognize and develop role of high-technology in weaponry and personnel
  - Improve logistical and support to make “more capable of responding to emergencies”
  - Reduce PLA by 200,000 by 2005

# PRC policy towards Taiwan

- Continue “one country, two systems” and “peaceful reunification”
- Maintain and improve direct links
- Firmly oppose any form of separatist activities
- Context of Hong Kong and Macau
- “complete reunification of the motherland as soon as possible”
- Oppose hegemonism, power politics



# U.S. Policy towards Taiwan

- 1949-1970s: Strategic and military value
- 1970s: Rapprochement with PRC = declining value of Taiwan
- 1972 Shanghai Communiqué
  - Disagreements; ‘all Chinese believe one China and Taiwan is part of China’
- 1978 Communiqué
  - specific agreement to normalize
  - Not clear on Taiwan
  - Taiwan Relations Act [Public Law 96-] expresses “grave concern” and need for arms to “maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

# U.S. Policy (cont'd)

- 1982 Communiqué
  - China notes its fundamental policy of “peaceful reunification”
  - U.S. says it will reduce quantity, not increase quality of arms sales, looking towards “final resolution.”
  - President Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan re timing, negotiations
- Beijing has altered its stand on use of force

# Administration Policy before 2001: From ‘strategic ambiguity’ to ‘strategic clarity’

- “The United States will maintain the capacity to resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the security of the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan.”

Secretary Powell’s confirmation testimony

- U.S. will do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself” if attacked. President Bush, 4/25/01
- Robust relations with Taiwan
- No unilateral change in SQ by either, no use of force
- Support some international re-recognition (WHO)
- “...integrate [China’s] rising power into regional and global security, economic and political arrangements.”

Robert Zoellick, USTR, 2/25/04

# Administration Policy post-911: Less clear?

- “China threat” not top priority
- U.S. ‘needs China;’ President warns Taiwan against declaration of independence
- Towards region as a whole: 21<sup>st</sup> century conflict, policing of non-state actors, cooperation

# Current Developments and U.S. Options

- US State Department Censure for PRC human rights record
- Pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, and PRC warnings to the SAR
- Hope KMT wins election??

# Final Settlement Scenarios

- Loose Confederation – British Commonwealth/ Russian Federation/ European model
  - More independence than HK, Macau
- Not Hong Kong
  - No lease that expired; no British legal system to manage handover; no major outside power to force hand


# Changing Military Picture After 2010

- Taiwan has expanded undersea capability with up to 4 diesel submarines
- Improved Taiwanese and U.S. ship defense systems
- Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense?
- U.S. has NMD But Taiwan lags in
  - Survivable C2; joint operability; cyber protection; missile and air defense; greater civilian participation in defense and crisis decision making Impact of Base Realignment?
    - » See Bernier and Gold, *NWCR* (Summer 2003)

# Further Questions on the Straits



# Japan's Future Security Policies



# Japanese Foreign Policy Pre-911: An Unusual, Reactive State

- Stable deterrence
- Open regional and international environment for trade and investment
- Sufficient in Middle East for flow of oil
- Deep popular and semi-official pacifism
- Strong subordination of military to central governmental control

# Japanese Foreign Policy and 911

- Response to 911 a sharp break from pacifism
  - PM Koizumi announced on 19 September 2001 plans to support U.S. reprisals
  - Terrorism “Japan’s own security issue”
  - New legislation to dispatch SDF overseas under wartime conditions passed in 3 weeks
  - Nov. 9, 2001 two destroyers and supply ship to Indian Ocean to refuel U.S./UK, first military deployment during hostilities since WWII
- Sources of new leadership
  - 1994 electoral reforms
  - 1999 Government reforms
  - 2001 administrative reform following Kobe, Peru, oil spill

# Japanese Foreign Policy post-911: Towards “normal” statehood?

- Nuclear Taboo broken
- Possible revision of Constitution's Article 9
- U.S. – Japan Defense Guidelines reworked to suggest that Japan would actively participate in response to crises on Peninsula and in Strait (ambiguity remains)
- Proactivism in face of unsettling neighborhood

# Growing PRC confidence

- Never more secure, confident in last century and a half
- Confident of mutual interdependence with U.S., sustained investment opportunities, access to U.S. capital, technology and markets
- GWOT provided reasons for cooperation – support for ENDURING FREEDOM
- Acknowledged as possible lever on DPRK
- Pleased with U.S. frustration with Taiwan's pace of weapons requests and unclear strategic thinking
- Central role in APEC, UNSC, SCO, WTO – “soft power”
- BUT: economic dislocation, disparities; political reform trajectory.

# Russia

- Decline in influence with all Asian states
  - Military power
  - Economic leverage
  - Ideological leadership
  - “soft power” in general
- Decline in influence in Central Asia, to benefit of U.S.
- Remaining leverage:
  - Possible pipeline for far eastern energy resources to China, Japan
  - Arms sales to China, India – limited, and not likely to remain on top of hardware gamecs

# A Security Community?

- What is necessary?
- Changes in consciousness
  - “we-feeling”
  - Trust
  - Shared images of world and others
  - Evidenced in policy making groups
- Policy outcomes
  - Evidence of convergent interests
  - “Spillover” from one issue area to other
  - Overall decrease in tensions

# Mixed Evidence

- Asianization of Asian security
- Peace for three decades
- Most do not fear for survival
- Stable and predictable environment even where conflict
- Prosperity despite AFC
- Likelihood of war diminished in most areas
- Some progress towards institutionalization
  - Garofano, *Asian Survey* (Spring 2002)



# Dangers of Security Communities

- Costs of peace: oppression, repression, political stagnation
- Hinder democratization
- Whose rules, whose norms, will govern?
- Who belongs?
- Opportunity costs to end of American hegemony
  - Dampening of historical tensions
  - Dampening of conflict
  - Opposition to proliferation
  - Secure economic order

# Problems with Asian Institutions: Case of the Asean Regional Forum

- 13 nations+ engaged in confidence-building
- Power politics explains much of successes, and failures
- Principles of non-interferences, consensus hinder tackling of hard issues – defense purchases and arms control, South China Sea, Chinese ambitions

# Third alternative:

## A Concert of Great Powers

- Best aspects of 19<sup>th</sup> c. Europe
- Regulation
  - Meetings
  - Consultations
  - Shared values, shared interests will vary
- Maintain bilateral alliances
- The Great Dilemma: contain/shape/integrate China

# Rivalry and Conflict?

- Varied causes of war
  - National interest and expected utility
  - Domestic/ internal politics
  - Miscalculation
- Korean Peninsula
- Straits
- Unexpected challenges?

# Longer Term

- Unified Korea: the “dagger” again?
- Japan as a normal power
- Democracy or Disintegration in China
- How to deal with these challenges?

# U.S. Options

- System of Bi-lateral alliances
  - Strengthen
  - Replace
  - Augment
- Are there limits to utility of such agreements?
- Will we have more takers or fewer?
- Base realignment

## East Asia

# Questions

